Objectives To study and report the attitudes and practices ofphysicians in a former Soviet republic regarding issues pertaining to patients' rights, physician negligence and the acceptance ofgratuities from patients. Design 
the specific situation in Estonia, they indirectly provide a reflection of the broader system of 'Soviet socialized medicine' (1) that was imposed throughout the former Soviet republics (2) .
Prior to the Gorbachev era, Western interest in Soviet medical ethics focused primarily on the ethics of Soviet psychiatry. Political dissidents were frequently classified as mentally ill simply for expressing their opposition to state policies (3) (4) (5) . Psychiatric hospitals functioned as prisons for these dissidents, classified as suffering from 'sluggish schizophrenia', a condition recognised only by Soviet psychiatrists (6) . These practices led to international condemnation of Soviet psychiatry, and the withdrawal of the Russian Psychiatric Society from the World Psychiatric Association in the face of its impending expulsion (7) .
During the period of perestroika in the late 1980s, physicians and ethicists initiated a dialogue about Soviet attitudes and policies regarding broader issues in medical ethics (8) (9) (10) (11) . These discussions remained largely abstract and descriptive, presenting little empirical information about actual clinical attitudes and practices. Similarly, more recent discussions of Soviet ethical practices draw broad general conclusions without presenting supporting data (12) . This paper presents data pertaining to three key issues of medical ethics as they existed in Estonia at the time of the Soviet collapse: recognition of patients' rights pertaining to treatment; attitudes and practices regarding adverse outcomes from treatment possibly related to physician negligence, and physicians' acceptance of cash or other goods from patients as 'tips'. These data were gathered as part of a survey of a stratified random sample of nearly 20 per cent of the physicians practising in Estonia in 1991.
Survey methods
Using a list of all physicians practising in Estonia in 1991 (excluding those in the military and the KGB), a stratified random sample of 1,000 physicians was selected for survey. Stratification criteria included age, sex, and ethnicity. Each physician was visited at her/his place of work and offered a survey question- 1/% 2 The patient (is) should be able to complain to the chief doctor of the department. 72% 58% 62% 50% 3 The patient (is) should be able to complain to the chief doctor of the polyclinic or 21% 9% 10% 8% hospital. 4 The patient (is) should be able to complain to an official in the Health Ministry. 3% 1% 0% 2% Secondly, it is interesting to note that ethnic Russians practising in Estonia take a somewhat more strident view than ethnic Estonians of the appropriate response to physician negligence. Using x2 analysis, Russians are more likely to be of the opinion that the medical society rather than the local facility should deal with patient complaints and physician negligence (p<0 01, likelihood ratio). They are also more likely to believe that patients should receive monetary compensation for adverse treatment outcomes (p<0 01) and that physicians who exhibit gross negligence should lose their medical licence (p=0 03). It appears that Russians tend to put more trust in central authority to handle physician negligence, while Estonians prefer local autonomy to deal with these issues. (Interviews with physicians indicated that these goods often would be put aside by shopkeepers for their preferred customers, such as their doctor.) For those obtaining such goods, the average number of times they did so in the previous month was three.
It seems that extra payment from patients was the rule for physicians in Estonia. In preliminary interviews, physicians did not seem embarrassed about receiving these payments. Only 5-10 per cent of the 792 physicians surveyed failed to answer the question about extra payments.
Discussion
The general picture that emerges from these data is of a medical profession that assumed a somewhat parental role towards its patients. To a Soviet physician, it was not necessary to inform a patient of risks associated with treatment, other treatment alternatives, or a poor prognosis associated with the patient's condition. The Soviet attitude towards cancer speaks for itself. Likewise, physicians seemed to discuss a patient's condition freely with others without first obtaining the patient's consent. Finally, even when a patient refused treatment, in many instances the physician would continue that treatment.
By Western standards, these behaviours are easily seen as violating patients' rights. However, Soviet society was not one that placed a great deal of import on individual rights and freedoms. Compared to individual political rights, patients' rights regarding medical care more closely approximated what patients in the West have come to expect. As the Soviet health care system undergoes reform, it would seem to be important to achieve consensus on what patients can rightly expect in the areas of informed consent, full disclosure of medical information, confidentiality, and refusal of treatment. Policy-makers may want to consider giving patients or their advocates an important role in these discussions.
There seems to be substantial sentiment among physicians that a more rigorous system of quality assurance and peer review needs to be established. There are few mechanisms to deal with physician negligence when it arises, and no mechanisms to identify negligent physicians before they cause harm. Gorbachev's first minister of health, Evgeni Chazov, was quite frank in acknowledging the low level of knowledge and skills of many Soviet physicians (17) . The questionable and variable quality of available care was well known to patients. More than 50 per cent of people in Russia are dissatisfied with their current health care system, and especially with the attitudes and moral standards of physicians (1 8) .
Current practice as well as current majority opinion is that issues of physician negligence and patient harm should be handled within the local facility, preferably within the department in which it occurs. Unfortunately, this situation presents two potential ethical problems. Physicians in many Western countries have not historically demonstrated an ability to police themselves rigorously in the absence of some outside authority. There is little reason to think that Estonian or Russian physicians would be able to do a better job. In addition, leaving the enforcement of quality standards to the local facility involves wide variability in the standards used to assess physicians' actions. Without some more general authority playing a central role in developing quality assurance mechanisms, there would be few means to develop generally applicable standards of care, a necessary step before patients' trust in the medical profession can be increased.
There appears to be a consensus regarding what body should have responsibility for monitoring physician behaviour. If a strong central authority is needed, physicians believe it should be their professional medical society and not a government agency. The abuse of power endemic in the Soviet bureaucracy has left a near unanimous distrust of government's ability to monitor medical care fairly or effectively. Additionally, there appears to be a growing consensus that some form of monetary compensation should be established for patients injured as a result of medical care. Whether this should come in the form of a malpractice tort system or a no-fault system of compensation is a question that warrants attention.
The issue of physicians accepting tips from their patients is a complex one, and has implications that vary with the perspective one adopts. The system of 'under the table payments' to doctors was widespread in the Soviet Union (19) and other Sovietdominated countries (20, 21) . Field addresses how we should view these payments.
'The fine point, and one that cannot be determined, is whether these payments, whether solicited, requested, or hinted at should be regarded as bribes for preferential treatment or tokens of gratitude or both. But perhaps, more than anything else, they constitute a countervailing power at the disposal of the patient to exert some type of control over the physician' (22) .
Before attempting to answer the question posed by Field, it is important to consider two anecdotes recently reported in the press. One occurred in the former Soviet Union; one occurred in the US.
A legislative representative reported that it had become common for surgeons in her district to expect a payment of $500 for an operation over and above what the government health plan pays. 'Everyone knows about this,' the legislator contends, 'but no one says anything' (23) .
An elderly man with a bad back consulted a specialist and was told he must first sign a contract agreeing to pay the doctor a fee in addition to what the government health plan would pay. 'They said, "If you don't sign we won't service you"', the patient reports. 'Look, you've been referred to this doctor as the best. You're anxious. You're sick. You'd probably give him your right arm. And you're certainly not going to cause trouble and question him' (24) .
In By comparison, payment as a condition of treatment is at the economic core of the system of health care that has developed in the US over the last hundred years. The American Medical Association historically has viewed a system of private medical insurance based on fee-for-service payment of physicians as, 'foresighted, American, economical' (26) . Systems involving salaried physicians and prepayment for medical services were seen as representing 'sovietism' and were explicitly labelled as unethical (27) .
The British National Health Service (NHS) presents quite a different history. To a large extent, it was the perception of the social inequities inherent in a system of medical care that links access to care with the ability to pay that led to the development of the NHS. For many years, physicians in the NHS did not revert to supplemental fees, official or otherwise, to augment their salary. While a certain amount of queue-jumping based on ability to pay did occur, it was not perceived to present a major problem (28) . However, recent NHS reforms have injected more market-based incentives into the NHS, leading some authors to suggest that ethical questions of this type may become more prevalent (29, 30) .
In all modem societies, medical care has come to be a relatively scarce commodity. While in the UK a guaranteed basic level of medical care has been available to all regardless of the ability to pay, in the US it has been made available largely according to the ability to pay. The best of treatment in the US has always been available to those who can pay (either out of their own pocket or through their insurance). Those who can't pay are relegated to a second tier of publicly financed or charitable facilities that often provide excellent care but do not represent the best the system has to offer.
In Soviet society, high quality care (by relative standards) was also a scarce commodity. As with other scarce commodities in the Soviet Union, these services were available through the 'second economy' on an unofficial barter system. (We should not confuse the Soviet second economy with the black market, which represented yet another level of economic activity.) Consider the Russian family with a plugged toilet. It could take weeks before the state plumber would get around to coming and fixing it. On the other hand, if the family happened to have an extra sausage or bottle of vodka, the toilet would be fixed before dinner, often by the very same state plumber.
The Soviet second economy represented (and in many areas continues to represent) a relatively orderly economic system for the distribution of scarce goods and services. Through the effect of supply and demand, a system of prices was established, and it came commonly to be understood that payment in kind was expected. This was as true for food and clothing as it was for medical care.
It would seem then that physicians and patients in Soviet-dominated societies jointly participated in a fee-for-service system for medical care, albeit an unofficial one. From a Western perspective, this system places the physician on tenuous ethical ground, particularly when a gift or tip is required as a condition of service. It is easy to speak judgmentally of these extra payments as bribes, as many authors are wont to do (12) . However, if we label the system of extra fees for Soviet physicians as unethical, we would be hard pressed to explain why the fee-for-service system that has existed in the United States does not also present similar, though less blatant, ethical questions. The unresolved question in both countries, and one that may hold increasing significance for the NHS, is: When does a physician demanding extra payment as a condition of treatment cross the line of ethical behaviour? A satisfactory answer to this question would be an important contribution to the ethical standards of all three systems.
